Dividend Tax Capitalization and Liquidity by Sikes, Stephanie A & Verrecchia, Robert E
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Accounting Papers Wharton Faculty Research
12-2015
Dividend Tax Capitalization and Liquidity
Stephanie A. Sikes
University of Pennsylvania
Robert E. Verrecchia
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/accounting_papers
Part of the Accounting Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/accounting_papers/21
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sikes, S. A., & Verrecchia, R. E. (2015). Dividend Tax Capitalization and Liquidity. Review of Accounting Studies, 20 (4), 1334-1372.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11142-015-9323-1
Dividend Tax Capitalization and Liquidity
Abstract
We provide a new explanation for cross-sectional variation in dividend tax capitalization. Our analysis is
twofold. First, we conduct a theoretical analysis that shows that liquidity (illiquidity) mitigates (magnifies) the
positive effect of dividend taxes on expected rates of return documented in prior literature. Second, we
conduct an empirical analysis centered around the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of
2003, which reduced the difference between the maximum statutory dividend and capital gains tax rates, and
find results consistent with our theory. We also provide results suggesting that institutional ownership’s
mitigating effect on dividend tax capitalization documented in prior studies is attributable to stocks with
greater institutional ownership being more liquid and not to the “marginal investor” being insensitive to
dividend taxes.
Keywords
dividend taxes, liquidity, tax capitalization, expected rate of return
Disciplines
Accounting
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/accounting_papers/21
Dividend Tax Capitalization and Liquidity 
 
 
Stephanie A. Sikes† 
The Wharton School 
University of Pennsylvania 
ssikes@wharton.upenn.edu 
 
Robert E. Verrecchia 
The Wharton School 
University of Pennsylvania 
verrecch@wharton.upenn.edu  
 
 
November 2012 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We provide a new explanation for cross-sectional variation in dividend tax capitalization. Using 
historical dividend tax rates from 1988-2006, we find that lower liquidity amplifies the positive 
relation between expected rates of return and the dividend tax rate documented in prior literature. 
Our results suggest that prior studies that conclude that institutional ownership mitigates 
dividend tax capitalization due to institutional investors being tax-exempt or insensitive to 
dividend tax rate changes suffer from an omitted correlated variable: liquidity.  
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1 Introduction
For decades researchers in economics, nance, and accounting have debated and sought
evidence that dividend taxes are impounded into the value of equity shares (e.g., Black and
Scholes 1974; Litzenberger and Ramaswamy 1979, 1980, 1982; Miller and Scholes 1978, 1982;
Ayers, Cloyd, and Robinson 2002; Dhaliwal, Li and Trezevant 2003; and Dhaliwal, Krull,
Li, and Moser 2005). In order to identify the e¤ect, several papers predict and nd that
the positive relation between expected pretax rates of return and dividend taxes is higher
the lower the institutional ownership in a rm. Such studies argue that the tax status of
the marginal investor determines the extent to which dividend taxes are impounded into
stock price (Miller and Scholes 1982). These studies presume that institutional investors are
tax-insensitive, either because they are exempt from taxes (e.g., pensions) or because they
are corporations and thus are not tax-disadvantaged with respect to dividends. Moreover,
they presume that the remainder of a rms shareholders are tax-sensitive. These studies
hold that as the percent of a rms shares that are owned by institutional investors increases,
the likelihood that the marginal investor setting price is tax-sensitive decreases, and as a
result, the extent to which dividend taxes are impounded into price decreases (e.g., Ayers,
Cloyd, and Robinson 2002; Dhaliwal, Li and Trezevant 2003; Dhaliwal, Krull, Li, and Moser
2005; Dhaliwal, Krull, and Li 2007; Campbell, Chyz, Dhaliwal, and Schwartz 2011).
The marginal investor approach described above is inconsistent with the after-tax Cap-
ital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) developed by Brennan (1970) and Gordon and Bradford
(1980) where investors form portfolios to maximize their after-tax return. In such a general
1
equilibrium analysis, the weighted-average tax rate of all investors in the economy (where
the weight depends on investorsrisk tolerances), rather than the tax rate of the marginal
investor, determines the extent of dividend tax capitalization (e.g., Brennan 1970; Gordon
and Bradford 1980; Michaely and Vila 1995; Guenther and Sansing 2006, 2010; Bond, De-
vereux, and Klemm 2007). Despite this, researchers continue to rely upon the marginal
investor approach in their empirical designs. In this paper, we o¤er an explanation for why
prior studies nd that institutional ownership mitigates dividend tax capitalization that has
nothing to do with the tax status of institutional investors. Our results suggest that lower
liquidity amplies, and higher liquidity attenuates, the general positive relation between the
dividend tax rate and rmsexpected pretax rates of return (hereinafter referred to as ex-
pected rates of return). Moreover, we show that once one controls for liquidity, institutional
ownership no longer mitigates the e¤ect of dividend taxes on expected rates of return.
Although the prediction that lower liquidity amplies, and higher liquidity mitigates,
dividend tax capitalization may seem intuitive, to our knowledge no one has posited or
tested this prediction. We suspect that this is the result of prior studies of tax capitalization
having relied on the after-tax CAPM for their motivation. The CAPM assumes that markets
are perfectly competitive; as such, it harbors no notion of liquidity (see, e.g., Lambert, Leuz,
and Verrecchia 2012). In contrast, our analysis is motivated by the assumption that all
markets are imperfectly competitive to some degree, and under this assumption liquidity
plays a central role.
The intuition for our analysis is very simple. As the market for a rms shares becomes
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less liquid, share price becomes more sensitive to changes in features of the economy. Share
price is more sensitive in a less liquid market because less liquidity implies that there is less
cushionto absorb shocks to, or changes in, the economy. Features of an economy whose
change might result in price shocks include investor-level tax rates, investorsaversion to
risk, the quality of information about the rm, etc. As these features change, and as the
market becomes less liquid, heightened price sensitivity implies that the absolute value of the
percentage change in price increases. For example, as the market for a rms shares becomes
increasingly less liquid, a reduction in the dividend tax rate leads to an increasingly larger
percentage increase in price. Similarly, as the market becomes increasingly less liquid, an
increase in the dividend tax rate leads to an increasingly larger percentage decline in price.
Because the absolute value of the percentage change in price is associated negatively with
liquidity, lower liquidity will amplify the e¤ect of a tax rate change on a rms expected
rate of return, whereas higher liquidity will attenuate the e¤ect. This implies that when one
assesses the behavior of a rms expected rate of return, the e¤ect of the dividend tax rate
cannot be divorced from the level of liquidity in the market for the rms shares.
We empirically test the e¤ect of liquidity on the relation between dividend tax rates and
expected rates of return over the period 1988-2006; during this time the maximum statutory
dividend tax rate varies from 15 percent to 39.6 percent. Our proxy for expected rates
of return are annual estimates of the implied cost of equity capital. We use four di¤erent
models to estimate the implied cost of capital. These models are those suggested in Claus
and Thomas (2001); Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001); Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth
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(2005), as implemented in Gode and Mohanram (2003); and Easton (2004). We also use
a measure that equals the average of the estimates from the four above models. We use
Amihuds (2002) measure of price impact as our measure of illiquidity. Amihuds ratio
gives the absolute percentage price change per dollar of daily trading volume, or the daily
price impact of the order ow. In this sense, the measure is consistent with Kyles (1985)
concept of illiquidity (), or the response of price to order ow. Consistent with dividend tax
capitalization, we nd that expected rates of return are positively related to the dividend tax
rate. Moreover, consistent with our prediction, we nd that the positive relation is stronger
among less liquid stocks.
Next, we replicate the results in prior studies that dividend tax capitalization is weaker
among stocks with higher institutional ownership. However, once we control for liquidity,
we no longer nd that institutional ownership plays a mitigating role. These results suggest
that prior studies that use institutional ownership to proxy for the tax status of the marginal
investor su¤er from an omitted correlated variable: liquidity.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss prior literature. In Section 3, we
present the empirical analyses. Section 4 concludes.
2 Prior Literature
Over the past several decades, research on the economics of dividend taxation has centered
on three basic theories: the tax irrelevance view, the traditional view, and the new
view. Under the tax irrelevance view, taxable individuals are infra-marginal. In other
4
words, a non-taxable entity (e.g., a pension fund) or symmetrically taxed investor (e.g., a
securities dealer) is the relevant price-setter (Black and Scholes 1974; Miller and Scholes
1978, 1982). As a result, changes in the dividend tax rate do not a¤ect expected rates
of return, and thereby do not a¤ect investment, payout, and nancing decisions. Under
the traditional view, there are non-tax benets from paying dividends and the manager sets
dividend policy at the point where the marginal benet of an extra dollar of dividends equals
the marginal tax cost. Reductions in the dividend tax rate can lower the required pretax
rate of return. Moreover, because the traditional view assumes that the marginal source of
funds for investment is new equity issues (assuming no debt), reductions in the dividend tax
rate can also lead to greater investment and higher dividend payouts. The new view assumes
that retained earnings are the marginal source of investment funds and all retentions will
eventually be distributed as taxable dividends. The market value of equity capitalizes all
expected taxes on current and future dividends, even for non-dividend paying rms. The
new view predicts that an increase in the dividend tax rate leads to lower equity prices, but
dividend yields per se do not explain rm value (because all taxes are already impounded
into price, even for non-dividend paying rms) and thus investment and payout decisions
are una¤ected (Auerbach 1979; Bradford 1981; King 1977). The new view is consistent with
what one might expect to occur when a dividend tax rate change is permanent. In reality,
the process via which dividend taxes a¤ect prices is likely a combination of the traditional
view and the new view.1
1 Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) provide a discussion of the three di¤erent views. This paragraph relies
heavily on Section 5.1.1 of their paper.
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In their recent review of the tax literature, Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) discuss that one
of the unresolved issues in the literature on the e¤ect of dividend taxes on asset prices is the
relevancy of the marginal investor in determining the pricing of dividend taxes. The marginal
investor approach to dividend taxation holds that the tax status of the marginal investor in
a rm determines the pricing of dividend taxes (Miller and Scholes 1982; Harris and Kemsley
1999; Ayers et al. 2002; Dhaliwal et al. 2003). While the marginal investor perspective could
prevail in an economy comprised of two securities whose returns are correlated perfectly and
that only di¤er in terms of their tax treatment, this (exact) scenario seems a poor descriptor
of markets in general. Moreover, the marginal investor approach suggests that clienteles
should form according to tax status. But if only the tax rate of the marginal investor
matters, then tax-based arbitrage opportunities should arise for investors who are not in the
marginal investor group, and vice versa. Thus, the equilibrium generated from the marginal
investor approach appears to be unstable.
Because diversication is important to investors, an approach that incorporates risk-
sharing seems more plausible. One such approach is the after-tax CAPM developed by
Brennan (1970) and Gordon and Bradford (1980). As Hanlon and Heitzman (2010, 165)
remark:
In the after-tax CAPM, heterogeneously taxed investors form portfolios to max-
imize after-tax returns. Taxable investors hold dividend-paying stocks because
they cannot replicate their risk exposure with non-dividend-paying stocks; they
just hold slightly less because of the tax penalty (see also Long 1977). Thus, equi-
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librium asset prices reect the aggregate preferences of investors and investors
with the greatest wealth and risk aversion have the greatest inuence on price.
All investors are marginal in the sense that a change in the taxation of any group
potentially a¤ects asset demand and prices.
Despite the theoretical appeal of the after-tax CAPM approach, disagreement over whether
the marginal investor approach or the after-tax CAPM better characterizes the pricing of
dividend taxes remains. For instance, Poterba (2007) states that it is not clear which ap-
proach better describes market equilibrium.
Our prediction that greater liquidity moderates and lower liquidity magnies the positive
relation between dividend tax rates and expected rates of return is based on the assumption
that markets are imperfectly competitive to some degree (e.g., Lambert, Leuz, and Verrec-
chia 2012). In an imperfectly competitive market, liquidity plays a central role. While the
after-tax CAPM model assumes perfect competition and here liquidity plays no role, we
concur with the prediction derived from the after-tax CAPM model that the pricing of div-
idend taxes is a function of the weighted-average tax rates of all investors - not just the tax
rate of a hypothetical marginal investor. A theoretical model of an imperfectly competitive
market where dividends are taxed and investors face heterogeneous tax treatment generates
the same prediction.2 Our contribution is to show empirically that the mitigating role of
institutional ownership on dividend tax capitalization that prior empirical studies attribute
to the marginal investor being tax-insensitive to dividends is actually attributable to greater
2 The proof is available upon request.
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liquidity mitigating dividend tax capitalization. In the absence of allowing an imperfectly
competitive market to price dividend taxes, such a prediction would be impossible. Our
clarication of what prior studies are actually capturing when they use institutional own-
ership to proxy for the tax status of the marginal investor is important because as long
as researchers continue to use institutional ownership as a means to identify dividend tax
capitalization, they risk making incorrect inferences.
We are not the rst to disagree with prior studies use of the percentage of a rms
outstanding shares owned by institutional investors to proxy for the marginal investor being
tax-insensitive to dividends. According to Guenther and Sansing (2010), one reason that
prior empirical studies nd that institutional holdings mitigate dividend tax capitalization is
that institutional holdings are correlated negatively with individual (i.e., taxable) investors
tolerances for risk. Despite Guenther and Sansings (2010) suggestion that researchers cease
to base their predictions about dividend tax capitalization on the tax status of the marginal
investor, researchers continue to do so (e.g., Campbell, Chyz, Dhaliwal, and Schwartz 2012).
3 Empirical Tests
In this section, we empirically test our prediction that lower liquidity amplies and higher
liquidity attenuates the positive relation between expected rates of return and the dividend
tax rate. We begin our sample period in 1988, which is the year the reduction in the dividend
tax rate enacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 became fully e¤ective. Table 1 presents the
maximum statutory dividend tax rate in each of the years of our sample period (1988-2006).3
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The rate varies from as low as 15 percent to as high as 39.6 percent.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
We rst estimate the following Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to document
the positive relation between expected rates of return and the dividend tax rate predicted
by both the traditional and new views of dividend tax capitalization:
EXPECTED RETURNi;y = 1 + 2DIV TAXRATEy + 3AMIHUDi;y 1 +
4INSTi;y 1 + 5Y IELDi;y 1 + 6SIZEi;y 1 + 7BMi;y 1 +
8ROEi;y 1 + 9LEVi;y 1 + 10BETA_MKTRFi;y 1 +
11BETA_SMBi;y 1 + 12BETA_HMLi;y 1 + 13BETA_UMDi;y 1 +
14FBIASi;y 1 + 15 44INDUSTRYi;y 1 + ": (1)
Our proxy for expected rates of return are annual estimates of implied cost of capital. We
use four di¤erent models to estimate the implied cost of capital measures. These models
are those suggested in Claus and Thomas (2001); Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001);
Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005), as implemented in Gode and Mohanram (2003); and
Easton (2004).4 The basic idea of all four models is to substitute price and analyst forecasts
into a valuation equation and to back out the cost of capital as the internal rate of return
3 Our sample consists of scal years 1988-2005. The implied cost of capital is estimated ten months after
scal year-end. We use the tax rate that is e¤ective when the implied cost of capital is estimated. Thus, our
tests include dividend tax rates from the years 1988-2006.
4 We use annual as opposed to quarterly estimates to avoid the error in quarterly forecasts (which tends
to average out if aggregated over a year) and because of the seasonality in quarterly data. We thank Luzi
Hail and Christian Leuz for sharing these annual measures of cost of capital with us and refer readers to the
appendices of Hail and Leuz (2006, 2009) for a detailed explanation of the calculation of each measure.
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that equates current stock price with the expected future sequence of residual incomes or
abnormal earnings. The individual models di¤er with respect to the use of analyst forecast
data, the assumptions regarding short-term and long-term growth, the explicit forecasting
horizon, and whether and how ination is incorporated into the steady-state terminal value.
We also use a measure that equals the average of the estimates generated by the four models.5
We use implied cost of capital measures because these are the most commonly used measures
of expected rates of return in dividend tax capitalization studies (e.g., Dhaliwal, Krull, Li
and Moser 2005; Dhaliwal, Krull and Li 2007; Chen, Dai, Shackelford and Zhang 2011;
Dhaliwal, Krull and Li 2011).
Our sample includes all rm-year observations associated with scal years ending in 1988
through 2005, with the exception that we exclude rm-year observations with scal year-ends
within the windows of July 1992 through September 1992 and June 2002 through August
2002. We exclude these rm-year observations because cost of capital is estimated ten months
after scal year-end; thus, the implied cost of capital for these observations is estimated in
the third quarter of 1993, which is the enactment quarter of the Revenue Reconciliation Act
of 1993, and in the second calendar quarter of 2003, which is the enactment quarter of the
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA03).
Our proxy for lower levels of liquidity is Amihuds (2002) measure of price impact. It
equals the ratio of the daily absolute return to the dollar trading volume on that day,
5 The subscript y on the dependent variable and the subscript y-1 on all of the independent variables
other than DIVTAXRATE denote that the implied cost of capital measures are estimated ten months after
the scal year-end. The year y coincides with the year in which implied cost of capital is estimated.
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averaged over the trading days in year y-1 for which there is return and volume data, or
AMIHUDi;y 1 =
1
Di;y 1
Di;y 1X
d=1
 
1; 000 
s
jRi;y 1;dj
V OLDi;y 1;d
!
where jRi ;y 1 ;d j is rm is absolute return on day d of year y-1, VOLD i;y 1;d is the respective
daily volume in dollars, and D i;y 1 is the number of days for which data are available for
rm i in year y-1. Amihuds ratio gives the absolute percentage price change per dollar of
daily trading volume, or the daily price impact of the order ow. The measure is consistent
with Kyles (1985) concept of illiquidity (), or the response of price to order ow. Similar
to Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2010), we use the square root version of the Amihud (2002)
measure. Consistent with Amihud (2002), we apply several restrictions when calculating the
ratio. First, we require for there to be stock return and volume data for more than 200 days of
year y-1 for rm i in order to calculate its ratio. Second, we require for the stock price to be
greater than $5 at the end of year y-1. Third, data to calculate rm is market capitalization
must be available at the end of year y-1. Fourth, after applying the restrictions above, we
winsorize observations for the measure at the 1st and 99th percentiles for each year. A
positive coe¢ cient on AMIHUD will be consistent with prior studiesnding that expected
rates of return are positively related to illiquidity (see, e.g., Amihud and Mendelson 1986;
Brennan and Subrahmanyam 1996; Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam 1998; Datar,
Naik, and Radcli¤e 1998; Haugen and Baker 1996, and Hu 1997 with respect to rm-level
liquidity, and Pastor and Stambaugh 2003 with respect to market-wide liquidity).
Consistent with prior literature, we control for the impact of information asymmetry
on a rms expected rate of return. We include several controls that prior studies nd are
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potentially associated with information asymmetry. These include the percent of outstanding
shares owned by institutional investors (INST ), rm size measured as the natural logarithm
of market capitalization (SIZE), book-to-market ratio (BM ), and leverage measured as the
sum of current and long-term liabilities scaled by total assets (LEV ). One might expect for
information asymmetry to be lower among larger rms and rms with greater institutional
investor ownership and higher among rms with higher book-to-market ratios and higher
leverage (Sadka and Scherbina 2007). We control for protability with the ratio of net
income before extraordinary items divided by book value of equity (ROE).
We control for dividend yield, YIELD, which equals the amount of dividends that rm
i paid to common shareholders in year y-1 scaled by rm is market capitalization, both
collected from Compustat (Ayers, Cloyd, and Robinson 2002). We set the variable equal to
zero for non-dividend-paying rms. We do not make a directional prediction for the main
e¤ect of YIELD. Although dividend yield is associated with the amount of dividend taxes
that investors currently have to pay and thus may be expected to be positively associated
with expected rates of return, studies show that it also reduces agency costs and information
asymmetry, which in turn reduces expected rates of return (Bhattacharya 1979; Miller and
Rock 1985; John and Williams 1985; and Jensen 1986).
We control for risk by including the coe¢ cient estimates from estimating a four-factor
Fama-French-Carhart model (Fama and French 1993; Carhart 1997) using return data from
the 48 months prior to year y-1 (BETA_MKTRF, BETA_SMB, BETA_HML, andBETA_UMD).
We also control for forecast bias, which could a¤ect implied cost of capital estimates. If fore-
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casts are overly optimistic and market participants understand this bias and adjust prices
accordingly, estimates generated from implied cost of capital models will be upwardly biased.
We control for forecast bias by including a control variable that equals one-year-ahead fore-
cast error (forecasts minus actual values), scaled by lagged total assets per share (FBIAS).
We control for industry e¤ects by including an indicator variable for each of Fama and
Frenchs 30 industry portfolios (Fama and French 1997). Consistent with Hail and Leuz
(2006), we truncate the ve cost of capital measures (r_ave, r_ct, r_oj, r_mpeg, r_gls) at
the bottom and top one percent.6 We winsorize all continuous independent variables, other
than DIVTAXRATE, used in our analysis at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Table 2 includes
variable denitions.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
Our sample includes rms that are listed on either the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),
American Stocks Exchange (AMEX), or NASDAQ; are in the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP)/Compustat Merged Database; have data on quarterly institutional holdings
reported on Form 13F available in the Thomson-Reuters database; and have analyst forecast
data on the Institutional BrokersEstimate System (I/B/E/S).
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis. All
values are reported in decimal format. The mean (median) implied cost of equity capital
over the sample period estimated using the models in Claus and Thomas (2001), Ohlson and
Juettner-Nauroth (2005) as implemented in Gode and Mohanram (2003), Easton (2004), and
6 The average of the four measures (r_ave) is calculated prior to the truncation.
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Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) equal 10.2 (9.7) percent, 12.5 (11.8) percent, 12.8
(11.6) percent, and 6.7 (6.7) percent, respectively. The mean implied cost of equity capital
using the average of the four estimates equals 10.5 (10.0) percent. The mean (median)
dividend tax rate is 32.2 (39.1) percent. The mean (median) AMIHUD is 13.5 (8.0). The
mean (median) percent ownership by institutional investors equals 55 (56) percent.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
Table 4 presents the results of estimating equation (1). Consistent with investors im-
pounding dividend taxes into stock price, the coe¢ cient on DIVTAXRATE is positive and
signicant at the one percent level in each of the columns. When the dependent variable
is the average of the four measures of implied cost of capital, the results suggest that an
increase in the dividend tax rate from 15 percent to 39.6 percent results in an increase of
140 basis points in the expected rate of return, which is a 13 percent change for the mean
rm. Consistent with prior studies that nd a positive relation between expected rates of
return and illiquidity, the coe¢ cient on AMIHUD is positive and signicant in columns (2)
and (3). It is also positive but not quite signicant in column (4) (p-value=0.101). The
coe¢ cients on the control variables are consistent with prior studies (i.e., expected rates
of return are lower for larger rms and rms with greater institutional ownership, and are
higher for rms with greater book-to-market ratios, greater leverage and greater risk). The
positive coe¢ cient on YIELD could suggest that the e¤ect of dividend taxes on expected
rates of return overwhelms any e¤ect of reduced information asymmetry and agency costs. It
is also consistent with Dhaliwal, Krull and Li (2007). The positive and signicant coe¢ cient
14
on FBIAS is consistent with Hail and Leuz (2009).
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
We next test our prediction that the positive relation between expected rates of return
and dividend tax rates is stronger among less liquid stocks by estimating the following OLS
regression:
EXPECTED RETURNi;y = 1 + 2DIV TAXRATEy + 3AMIHUDi;y 1 +
4DIV TAXRATEy  AMIHUDi;y 1 + 5INSTi;y 1 + 6Y IELDi;y 1 +
7DIV TAXRATEy  Y IELDi;y 1 + 8SIZEi;y 1 + 9BMi;y 1 +
10ROEi;y 1 + 11LEVi;y 1 + 12BETA_MKTRFi;y 1 +
13BETA_SMBi;y 1 + 14BETA_HMLi;y 1 + 15BETA_UMDi;y 1 +
16FBIASi;y 1 + 17 45INDUSTRYi;y 1 + ": (2)
A positive coe¢ cient on DIVTAXRATE*AMIHUD will be consistent with our prediction
that illiquidity magnies the positive relation between dividend tax rates and expected
rates of return. In addition to interacting DIVTAXRATE with AMIHUD, we interact it
with YIELD.7 However, we do not predict a sign for the interaction because as explained
in Section 2, although the traditional view of dividend taxation predicts for the positive
relation between dividend tax rates and expected rates of return to increase with dividend
yield, the new view holds that dividend yield is irrelevant in the pricing of dividend taxes.
7 We demean the values of DIVTAXRATE, AMIHUD, and YIELD used in the interaction terms by
subtracting their sample means. Demeaning, or centering, continuous variables used in interactions reduces
the amount of multicollinearity that is induced by multiplying together two independent variables. See Aiken
and West (1991) for a discussion of the benets of demeaning variables.
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Table 5 presents the results. Consistent with our prediction, we nd that the positive
relation between expected rates of return and dividend tax rates is signicantly greater for
less liquid rms. The coe¢ cient on the interaction DIVTAXRATE*AMIHUD is positive
and signicant at the one percent level in columns (1)-(3) and at the ve percent level in
columns (4)-(5). In terms of the economic magnitude, when the analysis is conducted using
the average of the four estimates as the dependent variable, the results suggest that when
the dividend tax rate is 15 percent, a one standard deviation increase in Amihuds (2002)
measure of price impact results in a 0.17 percentage point (i.e., 17 basis point) increase in
the expected rate of return, which is a 1.6 percent change for the mean rm. Moreover,
when the dividend tax rate is 39.6 percent, a one standard deviation increase in Amihuds
(2002) measure of price impact results in a 0.44 percentage point (i.e., 44 basis point)
increase in the expected rate of return, which is a 4.2 percent change for the mean rm.8
Consistent with the traditional view of dividend taxation, the coe¢ cient on the interaction
DIVTAXRATE*YIELD is positive and signicant at the one percent level in columns (1),
(2), (4), and (5) and at the ve percent level in the column (3).
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
As explained above, prior studies predict that the pricing of dividend taxes depends on
the tax status of the marginal investor (e.g., Dhaliwal, Li and Trezevant 2003; Ayers, Cloyd,
and Robinson 2002; Dhaliwal, Krull, Li and Moser 2005; Dhaliwal, Krull, and Li 2007;
8 We calculate the 0.17 percentage point as (15 percent*the coe¢ cient estimate on DIV-
TAXRATE*AMIHUD in column (1) (0.0659)*standard deviation of AMIHUD (0.1691)). The 1.6 percent
equals the 0.17 percentage point divided by the mean value of r_ave (0.1050).
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Campbell, Chyz, Dhaliwal, and Schwartz 2011). These studies predict that institutional
investor ownership mitigates dividend tax capitalization (i.e., dividend tax capitalization is
weaker the more likely it is that a tax-exempt or corporate investor is the marginal investor
setting price). Such a prediction is inconsistent with prior theoretical studies that rely
upon the after-tax CAPM. The after-tax CAPM predicts that the weighted-average tax
rate of all investors in the economy (where the weight depends on investorsrisk tolerances)
rather than the tax rate of the marginal investor in the rm is the relevant tax rate in
determining the extent of tax capitalization. We expect that the prior studies that use
institutional investor ownership to proxy for the tax status of the marginal investor su¤er
from an omitted correlated variable: liquidity. Stocks with greater institutional investor
ownership are generally more liquid. Over our sample period, we nd that the correlation
between INST and AMIHUD is negative and statistically signicant (untabulated Pearson
correlation =  0:45; p < 0:001). To investigate the issue further, we next estimate the OLS
regression below where instead of interacting DIVTAXRATE with AMIHUD, we interact
it with INST. We do so to replicate the result in prior studies that institutional ownership
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mitigates dividend tax capitalization.
EXPECTED RETURNi;y = 1 + 2DIV TAXRATEy + 3AMIHUDi;y 1 +
4INSTi;y 1 + 5DIV TAXRATEy  INSTi;y 1 + 6Y IELDi;y 1 +
7DIV TAXRATEy  Y IELDi;y 1 + 8SIZEi;y 1 + 9BMi;y 1 +
10ROEi;y 1 + 11LEVi;y 1 + 12BETA_MKTRFi;y 1 +
13BETA_SMBi;y 1 + 14BETA_HMLi;y 1 + 15BETA_UMDi;y 1 +
16FBIASi;y 1 + 17 45INDUSTRYi;y 1 + ": (3)
Table 6 reports the results. Consistent with the ndings in prior studies, we nd that
institutional ownership mitigates the positive relation between expected rates of return and
the dividend tax rate. The coe¢ cient on the interaction DIVTAXRATE*INST is negative
and signicant at the one percent level in columns (1), (2), (3), and (5) and at the ve
percent level in column (4).
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]
Next, we examine whether the nding in prior studies that institutional ownership mit-
igates dividend tax capitalization is due to an omitted correlated variable (i.e., liquidity).
We estimate the OLS regression below in which we interact DIVTAXRATE with INST as
18
well as with AMIHUD.
EXPECTED RETURNi;y = 1 + 2DIV TAXRATEy +
3AMIHUDi;y 1 + 4DIV TAXRATEy  AMIHUDi;y 1 +
5INSTi;y 1 + 6DIV TAXRATEy  INSTi;y 1 + 7Y IELDi;y 1 +
8DIV TAXRATEy  Y IELDi;y 1 + 9SIZEi;y 1 + 10BMi;y 1 +
11ROEi;y 1 + 12LEVi;y 1 + 13BETA_MKTRFi;y 1 +
14BETA_SMBi;y 1 + 15BETA_HMLi;y 1 + 16BETA_UMDi;y 1 +
17FBIASi;y 1 + 18 46INDUSTRYi;y 1 + ": (4)
If institutional ownership proxies for greater liquidity rather than the marginal investor
being tax-insensitive to dividends, then once we control for liquidity, we should no longer
nd that institutional ownership mitigates dividend tax capitalization. Table 7 reports
the results. Consistent with our prediction, the coe¢ cient on DIVTAXRATE*AMIHUD is
positive and signicant at the one percent level in columns (1)-(3) and at the ten percent level
in column (4). The interaction DIVTAXRATE*INST only remains negative and signicant
in column (5) (p-value < 0.05). Moreover, once we control for liquidity, the sign on the
interaction DIVTAXRATE*INST actually ips and becomes positive in column (2) (p-value
< 0.10). In summary, the results in Tables 6 and 7 suggest that prior studies that attribute
the mitigating role of institutional ownership on the pricing of dividend taxes to the marginal
investor being tax-insensitive su¤er from an omitted correlated variable problem. Once we
control for the e¤ect of liquidity on the relation between dividend tax rates and expected rates
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of return, we only nd very weak evidence that institutional ownership mitigates dividend
tax capitalization.
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE]
We are not the rst to disagree with the marginal investor interpretation. Prior theo-
retical studies posit that dividend tax capitalization is a function of the weighted-average
tax rate across all investors, where the weight depends on investorstolerances for risk (e.g.,
Brennan 1970; Gordon and Bradford 1980; Michaely and Vila 1995; Guenther and Sansing
2006, 2010; Bond, Devereux, and Klemm 2007). These studies are based on the after-tax
CAPM, which relies on markets being perfectly competitive. In contrast, our prediction is
based on the assumption that markets are imperfectly competitive to some degree. Regard-
less of whether the market is perfectly or imperfectly competitive, dividend tax capitalization
is a function of the weighted-average tax rate of all investors, not the tax rate of the marginal
investor. However, liquidity can only play a role in markets that are imperfectly competi-
tive. Although our prediction that higher liquidity mitigates and lower liquidity amplies
dividend tax capitalization may seem intuitive, prior studies have failed to considered this
cross-sectional prediction - this failure may be the result of prior studies on dividend tax
capitalization having relied on the after-tax CAPM for their motivation. In addition to
o¤ering a new explanation for cross-sectional variation in dividend tax capitalization, we
encourage researchers to cease basing their empirical tests of dividend tax capitalization
on cross-sectional variation in institutional holdings. Although institutional ownership is
correlated highly with liquidity, it is not the best available proxy for liquidity.
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3.1 Alternate Proxy for Liquidity
In this section, we ensure that our results and conclusions are robust to using a di¤erent
proxy for liquidity. We replace Amihuds (2002) measure of price impact with an estimate
of a rms e¤ective percentage bid-ask spread (Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam 2000;
Korajczyk and Sadka 2008). We measure the e¤ective percentage bidask spread on each
trading day as the absolute value of the di¤erence between the daily closing price and the
bid-ask midpoint, divided by the bid-ask midpoint. Then we calculate the average of the
ratio over the trading days in year y-1.
ESPREADi;y 1 =
1
ni;y 1
ni;y 1X
d=1
jpi;d  mi;dj
mi;d
where pi;d is the closing price of rm i on day d of year y 1;mi;d = (Aski;d+Bidi;d)=2, Aski;d
and Bidi;d are the closing ask and closing bid prices for day d, and ni;y 1 is the number of
trading days of rm i in year y   1. In calculating a rms average Espread for the year,
we require for the rm to have at least 200 daily observations. We re-estimate equations
(1)-(4), replacing AMIHUD with ESPREAD.
Table 8 presents the results. The number of observations is lower using ESPREAD be-
cause not as many rms have data on the bid and ask for at least 200 days out of the year
as have data on return and volume for at least 200 days, which are the inputs for Ami-
huds (2002) measure. Panel A presents the results of estimating equation (1), replacing
AMIHUD with ESPREAD. Consistent with dividend tax capitalization and an illiquidity
premium, respectively, the coe¢ cients on DIVTAXRATE and ESPREAD are positive and
signicant at the one percent level in all ve columns. Panel B presents the results of esti-
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mating equation (2), replacing AMIHUD with ESPREAD. Consistent with our prediction
that lower liquidity magnies and higher liquidity mitigates dividend tax capitalization, the
coe¢ cient on the interaction DIVTAXRATE*ESPREAD is positive and signicant at the
one percent level in the rst four columns. Panel C presents the results of estimating equa-
tion (3), replacing AMIHUD with ESPREAD. Consistent with the results in Table 6 and the
nding in prior studies that institutional ownership mitigates dividend tax capitalization,
the coe¢ cient on the interaction DIVTAXRATE*INST is negative and signicant at the
one percent level in columns (1), (3), and (5), and at the ve percent level in columns (2)
and (4). Panel D presents the results of estimating equation (4), replacing AMIHUD with
ESPREAD. Consistent with our expectation and the results in Table 7 using AMIHUD, the
coe¢ cient on the interaction DIVTAXRATE*ESPREAD is positive and signicant at the
one percent level in columns (1), (2), and (4) and at the ten percent level in column (3).
Moreover, consistent with our prediction that prior studies that attribute the mitigating
force of institutional ownership on dividend tax capitalization to the marginal investor be-
ing tax-insensitive su¤er from an omitted correlated variable problem, the coe¢ cient on the
interaction DIVTAXRATE*INST only remains signicant in columns (3) and (5).
In summary, the results using ESPREAD as our measure of illiquidity further support
our prediction that lower liquidity magnies, and higher liquidity mitigates, the general
positive relation between expected rates of return and dividend tax rates. This is important
because it suggests that prior studies that conclude that institutional ownership mitigates
dividend tax capitalization due to the marginal investor being tax-insensitive to dividends
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su¤er from an omitted correlated variable problem. To be clear, we are not suggesting that
these studies are incorrect in concluding that investors discount prices for the dividend taxes
that they expect to owe. Rather, we suggest that these studies are incorrect in concluding
that the tax rate of the marginal investor determines the extent to which price incorporates
dividend taxes.
3.2 Interaction of Dividend Yield and Illiquidity
Banerjee, Gatchev, and Spindt (2007) nd that after dividend initiations, rm value becomes
less sensitive to liquidity. If rms are more likely to pay a dividend the lower the dividend
tax rate, then one potential concern is that the positive coe¢ cients on the interactions DIV-
TAXRATE*AMIHUD and DIVTAXRATE*ESPREAD that we document are not actually
capturing that illiquidity magnies dividend tax capitalization but rather that paying a div-
idend alleviates the illiquidity premium. To address this potential concern, in untabulated
tests, we re-estimate equations (2)-(4) and add the interaction YIELD*AMIHUD. We also
re-estimate these equations using ESPREAD and add the interaction YIELD*ESPREAD.
Consistent with dividends mitigating the illiquidity premium, the coe¢ cient on the inter-
actions YIELD*AMIHUD and YIELD*ESPREAD are negative and signicant. However,
all of our results discussed above continue to hold.9 Thus, the positive coe¢ cients on DI-
VTAXRATE*AMIHUD and DIVTAXRATE*ESPREAD are indeed capturing that higher
liquidity mitigates and lower liquidity magnies dividend tax capitalization.
9 We do not tabulate these results for the sake of brevity. However, the results are available upon request.
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4 Conclusion
This paper provides a new explanation for cross-sectional variation in dividend tax capi-
talization. Unlike prior empirical studies that are motivated by the after-tax CAPM, our
analysis assumes that markets are imperfectly competitive to some degree; under this as-
sumption, liquidity plays a role in determining the e¤ect of dividend tax rates on rms
expected rates of return. We predict that lower liquidity amplies the positive e¤ect of the
dividend tax rate on expected rates of return, whereas higher liquidity attenuates the e¤ect.
We empirically test our prediction using historical, maximum statutory, investor-level tax
rates on dividend income from 1988-2006. The results are consistent with our expectation.
In addition to providing a new explanation for cross-sectional variation in dividend tax
capitalization, this paper provides an important implication for prior studies: prior studies
that attribute the attenuating force of institutional ownership on dividend tax capitalization
to the marginal investor being tax-exempt (or tax-insensitive with respect to dividends) may
su¤er from an omitted correlated variable problem. Once we control for the e¤ect of liquidity
on the relation between dividend tax rates and expected rates of return, we no longer nd
that institutional ownership mitigates dividend tax capitalization.
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Table 1 
Maximum Statutory Tax Rates on Dividend Income 
 
Year Maximum Statutory Tax Rate on Dividend Income 
1988 33% 
1989 33% 
1990 33% 
1991 31% 
1992 31% 
1993 39.6%a 
1994 39.6% 
1995 39.6% 
1996 39.6% 
1997 39.6% 
1998 39.6% 
1999 39.6% 
2000 39.6% 
2001 39.1% 
2002 39.1% 
2003 15%b 
2004 15% 
2005 15% 
2006 15% 
a: The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 was enacted in August 1993. 
b: The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 was enacted in May 2003. 
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Table 2 
Variable Definitions 
Variable  Definition 
r_ave  Average of r_ct, r_oj, r_mpeg, and r_gls 
r_ct 
 Implied cost of capital estimate based on the model suggested in Claus and Thomas 
(2001) 
r_oj 
 Implied cost of capital estimate based on the model suggested in Ohlson and Juettner-
Nauroth (2005), as implemented in Gode and Mohanram (2003) 
r_mpeg  Implied cost of capital estimate based on the model suggested in Easton (2004)  
r_gls 
 Implied cost of capital estimate based on the model suggested in Gebhardt, Lee, and 
Swaminathan (2001) 
DIVTAXRATE  Maximum statutory tax rate on dividend income  
AMIHUD  Square root of the ratio of the daily absolute return to the dollar trading volume on that day, averaged over the trading days in year y-1 for which there is return and volume data 
YIELD  Firm i's dividends paid to common shareholders divided by firm i's market capitalization; equal to zero for non-dividend paying firms 
INST  % of firm i's outstanding shares owned by institutional investors 
SIZE  Natural log of firm i's market capitalization 
BM  Firm i's book equity divided by market capitalization  
ROE  Firm i's net income before extraordinary items divided by book value of equity 
LEV  Sum of firm i's current and long-term liabilities scaled by total assets  
BETA_MKTRF  Firm i's loading on MKTRF from estimating Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor model using return data for the prior 48 months 
BETA_SMB  Firm i's loading on SMB from estimating Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor model using return data for the prior 48 months  
BETA_HML  Firm i's loading on HML from estimating Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor model using return data for the prior 48 months  
BETA_UMD  Firm i's loading on UMD from estimating Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor model using return data for the prior 48 months  
FBIAS  One-year-ahead forecast error (forecasts minus actual values), scaled by lagged total assets per share 
ESPREAD  Absolute value of the difference between the daily closing price and the bid-ask midpoint, divided by the bid-ask midpoint, averaged over the trading days in year y-1 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
   
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 5th Pctile 25th Pctile Median 75th Pctile 95th Pctile 
r_ave 0.1050 0.0310 0.0646 0.0844 0.0999 0.1197 0.1621 
r_ct 0.1018 0.0309 0.0613 0.0824 0.0969 0.1158 0.1581 
r_oj 0.1248 0.0343 0.0833 0.1022 0.1179 0.1394 0.1897 
r_mpeg 0.1277 0.0482 0.0733 0.0965 0.1157 0.1459 0.2245 
r_gls 0.0665 0.0332 0.0112 0.0432 0.0674 0.0883 0.1198 
DIVTAXRATE 0.3216 0.1053 0.1500 0.1500 0.3910 0.3960 0.3960 
AMIHUD 0.1353 0.1691 0.0138 0.0375 0.0796 0.1693 0.4389 
INST 0.5464 0.2227 0.1511 0.3872 0.5647 0.7140 0.8892 
YIELD 0.0131 0.0188 0.0000 0.0000 0.0042 0.0213 0.0500 
SIZE 20.6503 1.5391 18.3041 19.5522 20.5380 21.6494 23.4032 
BM 0.4987 0.3446 0.1191 0.2767 0.4349 0.6321 1.0797 
ROE 0.1211 0.2797 -0.0848 0.0736 0.1265 0.1777 0.3134 
LEV 0.2125 0.1795 0.0000 0.0508 0.1916 0.3306 0.5334 
BETA_MKTRF 1.0617 0.7286 0.0360 0.6240 1.0101 1.4342 2.3008 
BETA_SMB 0.5873 0.9215 -0.6296 0.0121 0.4517 1.0302 2.2703 
BETA_HML 0.1597 1.1689 -1.9607 -0.3880 0.3108 0.8479 1.7549 
BETA_UMD -0.1135 0.7426 -1.3098 -0.4532 -0.0737 0.2461 0.9757 
FBIAS 0.0021 0.0183 -0.0140 -0.0026 0.0000 0.0032 0.0242 
ESPREAD 0.0039 0.0036 0.0007 0.0014 0.0026 0.0052 0.0113 
          See Table 2 for variable definitions.   
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Table 4 
Effect of Dividend Tax Rates on Expected Rates of Return 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
r_ave r_ct r_oj r_gls r_mpeg 
DIVTAXRATE 0.0556*** 0.0549*** 0.0454*** 0.0712*** 0.0455*** 
  (33.259) (31.050) (22.803) (43.705) (16.452) 
AMIHUD 0.0028 0.0102*** 0.0083*** -0.0156*** 0.0060 
  (1.285) (4.519) (3.242) (-8.416) (1.641) 
INST -0.0009 0.0007 0.0017 -0.0056*** 0.0009 
  (-0.654) (0.518) (1.143) (-4.156) (0.455) 
YIELD 0.1009*** 0.0896*** 0.1057*** 0.1338*** 0.0884*** 
  (5.266) (4.270) (4.848) (7.138) (3.113) 
SIZE -0.0035*** -0.0023*** -0.0038*** -0.0029*** -0.0051*** 
  (-14.524) (-9.050) (-14.008) (-12.288) (-13.221) 
BM 0.0186*** 0.0053*** 0.0165*** 0.0238*** 0.0268*** 
  (18.668) (5.412) (14.501) (22.949) (16.487) 
ROE -0.0011 0.0061*** -0.0043*** 0.0056*** -0.0129*** 
  (-1.231) (5.678) (-4.112) (5.756) (-7.497) 
LEV 0.0220*** 0.0253*** 0.0230*** 0.0100*** 0.0310*** 
  (14.125) (14.390) (13.196) (6.561) (12.836) 
BETA_MKTRF 0.0041*** 0.0028*** 0.0045*** 0.0033*** 0.0060*** 
  (12.745) (8.410) (12.225) (9.837) (11.847) 
BETA_SMB 0.0029*** 0.0018*** 0.0033*** 0.0016*** 0.0043*** 
  (10.248) (6.280) (10.470) (6.023) (9.900) 
BETA_HML -0.0023*** -0.0006** -0.0023*** -0.0033*** -0.0024*** 
  (-9.726) (-2.372) (-8.604) (-13.451) (-6.916) 
BETA_UMD -0.0013*** -0.0007** -0.0019*** 0.0012*** -0.0035*** 
  (-4.296) (-2.181) (-5.481) (3.993) (-7.380) 
FBIAS 0.3312*** 0.2557*** 0.3713*** 0.1562*** 0.5131*** 
  (21.339) (16.074) (21.394) (12.693) (21.462) 
Constant 0.1405*** 0.1187*** 0.1682*** 0.0878*** 0.1921*** 
  (25.852) (21.230) (27.325) (16.517) (21.777) 
Observations 24,803 25,863 24,839 25,717 24,722 
R-squared 0.306 0.189 0.260 0.399 0.258 
This table presents results of estimating equation (1).  The dependent variable is r_ave, r_ct, r_oj, r_gls, and 
r_mpeg in columns (1)-(5), respectively. See Table 2 for variable definitions. Industry indicator variables are 
included in the estimation but suppressed in the table. T-statistics are calculated using standard errors 
clustered by firm and appear in parentheses below coefficient estimates. ***,**, * denote statistically 
significant at p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
 
 
  
33 
 
Table 5 
Effect of Liquidity on the Relation between  
Dividend Tax Rates and Expected Rates of Return 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
r_ave r_ct r_oj r_gls r_mpeg 
DIVTAXRATE 0.0571*** 0.0572*** 0.0469*** 0.0722*** 0.0475*** 
  (34.005) (32.619) (22.961) (44.083) (16.945) 
AMIHUD 0.0049** 0.0130*** 0.0107*** -0.0150*** 0.0076** 
  (2.311) (5.405) (4.300) (-7.729) (2.115) 
DIVTAXRATE*AMIHUD 0.0659*** 0.0894*** 0.0709*** 0.0246** 0.0492** 
  (5.895) (7.355) (5.318) (2.512) (2.482) 
INST -0.0012 0.0002 0.0014 -0.0058*** 0.0006 
  (-0.898) (0.126) (0.914) (-4.291) (0.274) 
YIELD 0.1056*** 0.0989*** 0.1100*** 0.1385*** 0.0942*** 
  (5.461) (4.676) (5.005) (7.224) (3.286) 
DIVTAXRATE*YIELD 0.2951*** 0.5521*** 0.2962** 0.2884*** 0.4698*** 
  (2.905) (5.177) (2.272) (3.036) (2.941) 
SIZE -0.0034*** -0.0022*** -0.0037*** -0.0029*** -0.0050*** 
  (-14.357) (-8.678) (-13.970) (-12.163) (-13.245) 
BM 0.0183*** 0.0048*** 0.0161*** 0.0237*** 0.0265*** 
  (18.224) (4.903) (14.145) (22.717) (16.228) 
ROE -0.0012 0.0060*** -0.0044*** 0.0055*** -0.0129*** 
  (-1.372) (5.554) (-4.232) (5.717) (-7.540) 
LEV 0.0220*** 0.0255*** 0.0230*** 0.0102*** 0.0311*** 
  (14.105) (14.573) (13.172) (6.640) (12.882) 
BETA_MKTRF 0.0041*** 0.0028*** 0.0045*** 0.0032*** 0.0060*** 
  (12.721) (8.327) (12.212) (9.741) (11.803) 
BETA_SMB 0.0028*** 0.0018*** 0.0032*** 0.0017*** 0.0043*** 
  (10.171) (6.258) (10.395) (6.035) (9.886) 
BETA_HML -0.0023*** -0.0006*** -0.0023*** -0.0033*** -0.0025*** 
  (-9.824) (-2.605) (-8.695) (-13.522) (-7.012) 
BETA_UMD -0.0013*** -0.0007** -0.0019*** 0.0012*** -0.0035*** 
  (-4.395) (-2.283) (-5.576) (3.991) (-7.378) 
FBIAS 0.3297*** 0.2533*** 0.3696*** 0.1558*** 0.5122*** 
  (21.171) (15.873) (21.240) (12.630) (21.402) 
Constant 0.1384*** 0.1161*** 0.1659*** 0.0873*** 0.1904*** 
  (25.783) (20.672) (27.570) (16.297) (21.862) 
Observations 24,803 25,863 24,839 25,717 24,722 
R-squared 0.308 0.192 0.262 0.400 0.258 
This table presents results of estimating equation (2).  The dependent variable is r_ave, r_ct, r_oj, r_gls, and 
r_mpeg in columns (1)-(5), respectively. See Table 2 for variable definitions. Industry indicator variables are 
included in the estimation but suppressed in the table. T-statistics are calculated using standard errors clustered 
by firm and appear in parentheses below coefficient estimates. ***,**, * denote statistically significant at p < 
0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 6 
Effect of Institutional Ownership on the Relation between  
Dividend Tax Rates and Expected Rates of Return 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
r_ave r_ct r_oj r_gls r_mpeg 
DIVTAXRATE 0.0578*** 0.0573*** 0.0477*** 0.0726*** 0.0488*** 
  (33.898) (32.023) (23.100) (44.167) (17.347) 
AMIHUD 0.0031 0.0103*** 0.0087*** -0.0156*** 0.0064* 
  (1.451) (4.528) (3.417) (-8.382) (1.764) 
INST -0.0017 -0.0000 0.0009 -0.0061*** -0.0002 
  (-1.213) (-0.009) (0.562) (-4.374) (-0.088) 
DIVTAXRATE*INST -0.0344*** -0.0239*** -0.0383*** -0.0156** -0.0464*** 
  (-4.555) (-2.997) (-4.290) (-2.296) (-3.726) 
YIELD 0.1032*** 0.0956*** 0.1076*** 0.1375*** 0.0924*** 
  (5.341) (4.532) (4.891) (7.174) (3.224) 
DIVTAXRATE*YIELD 0.1069 0.3764*** 0.0894 0.2129** 0.2586 
  (0.981) (3.279) (0.647) (2.156) (1.513) 
SIZE -0.0035*** -0.0023*** -0.0038*** -0.0029*** -0.0050*** 
  (-14.503) (-9.108) (-13.986) (-12.298) (-13.212) 
BM 0.0185*** 0.0051*** 0.0163*** 0.0237*** 0.0266*** 
  (18.533) (5.253) (14.394) (22.820) (16.368) 
ROE -0.0011 0.0061*** -0.0043*** 0.0055*** -0.0129*** 
  (-1.295) (5.630) (-4.171) (5.730) (-7.548) 
LEV 0.0222*** 0.0257*** 0.0232*** 0.0103*** 0.0312*** 
  (14.196) (14.650) (13.260) (6.664) (12.930) 
BETA_MKTRF 0.0040*** 0.0027*** 0.0045*** 0.0032*** 0.0059*** 
  (12.545) (8.211) (12.047) (9.678) (11.660) 
BETA_SMB 0.0028*** 0.0018*** 0.0032*** 0.0016*** 0.0043*** 
  (10.065) (6.226) (10.275) (5.973) (9.759) 
BETA_HML -0.0023*** -0.0006** -0.0023*** -0.0033*** -0.0024*** 
  (-9.736) (-2.490) (-8.606) (-13.483) (-6.954) 
BETA_UMD -0.0013*** -0.0007** -0.0019*** 0.0012*** -0.0036*** 
  (-4.342) (-2.143) (-5.535) (3.999) (-7.408) 
FBIAS 0.3300*** 0.2552*** 0.3699*** 0.1559*** 0.5116*** 
  (21.225) (16.031) (21.274) (12.652) (21.371) 
Constant 0.1399*** 0.1184*** 0.1675*** 0.0877*** 0.1913*** 
  (25.837) (21.264) (27.335) (16.482) (21.749) 
Observations 24,803 25,863 24,839 25,717 24,722 
R-squared 0.307 0.190 0.261 0.399 0.259 
This table presents results of estimating equation (3).  The dependent variable is r_ave, r_ct, r_oj, r_gls, and 
r_mpeg in columns (1)-(5), respectively. See Table 2 for variable definitions. Industry indicator variables are 
included in the estimation but suppressed in the table. T-statistics are calculated using standard errors clustered 
by firm and appear in parentheses below coefficient estimates. ***,**, * denote statistically significant at p < 
0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 7 
Analysis of Omitted Correlated Variable in Prior Studies 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
r_ave r_ct r_oj r_gls r_mpeg 
DIVTAXRATE 0.0574*** 0.0567*** 0.0473*** 0.0725*** 0.0487*** 
  (34.103) (32.264) (23.174) (44.207) (17.454) 
AMIHUD 0.0048** 0.0131*** 0.0105*** -0.0151*** 0.0072** 
  (2.259) (5.414) (4.230) (-7.773) (1.995) 
DIVTAXRATE*AMIHUD 0.0591*** 0.1001*** 0.0625*** 0.0194* 0.0255 
  (4.615) (7.058) (4.053) (1.700) (1.082) 
INST -0.0014 0.0005 0.0012 -0.0060*** -0.0001 
  (-1.007) (0.332) (0.751) (-4.298) (-0.028) 
DIVTAXRATE*INST -0.0103 0.0164* -0.0129 -0.0079 -0.0361** 
  (-1.214) (1.805) (-1.272) (-0.983) (-2.483) 
YIELD 0.1054*** 0.0994*** 0.1098*** 0.1382*** 0.0934*** 
  (5.442) (4.698) (4.986) (7.201) (3.252) 
DIVTAXRATE*YIELD 0.2527** 0.6169*** 0.2432* 0.2579** 0.3210* 
  (2.261) (5.251) (1.713) (2.516) (1.812) 
SIZE -0.0034*** -0.0022*** -0.0037*** -0.0029*** -0.0050*** 
  (-14.365) (-8.651) (-13.967) (-12.178) (-13.239) 
BM 0.0183*** 0.0047*** 0.0161*** 0.0237*** 0.0265*** 
  (18.237) (4.881) (14.159) (22.722) (16.253) 
ROE -0.0012 0.0060*** -0.0044*** 0.0055*** -0.0130*** 
  (-1.377) (5.564) (-4.238) (5.715) (-7.557) 
LEV 0.0221*** 0.0255*** 0.0230*** 0.0102*** 0.0312*** 
  (14.110) (14.568) (13.182) (6.640) (12.907) 
BETA_MKTRF 0.0041*** 0.0028*** 0.0045*** 0.0032*** 0.0060*** 
  (12.665) (8.372) (12.153) (9.703) (11.706) 
BETA_SMB 0.0028*** 0.0019*** 0.0032*** 0.0016*** 0.0043*** 
  (10.103) (6.314) (10.314) (5.990) (9.769) 
BETA_HML -0.0023*** -0.0006*** -0.0023*** -0.0033*** -0.0025*** 
  (-9.805) (-2.628) (-8.674) (-13.502) (-6.975) 
BETA_UMD -0.0013*** -0.0007** -0.0019*** 0.0012*** -0.0036*** 
  (-4.409) (-2.261) (-5.593) (3.978) (-7.420) 
FBIAS 0.3294*** 0.2537*** 0.3693*** 0.1556*** 0.5113*** 
  (21.148) (15.904) (21.213) (12.615) (21.353) 
Constant 0.1384*** 0.1160*** 0.1659*** 0.0873*** 0.1906*** 
  (25.786) (20.609) (27.548) (16.313) (21.814) 
Observations 24,803 25,863 24,839 25,717 24,722 
R-squared 0.308 0.192 0.262 0.400 0.259 
This table presents results of estimating equation (4).  The dependent variable is r_ave, r_ct, r_oj, r_gls, and 
r_mpeg in columns (1)-(5), respectively. See Table 2 for variable definitions. Industry indicator variables are 
included in the estimation but suppressed in the table. T-statistics are calculated using standard errors 
clustered by firm and appear in parentheses below coefficient estimates. ***,**, * denote statistically 
significant at p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 8 
Analysis Using Alternate Proxy for Liquidity 
 
Panel A: Estimation of equation (1) replacing AMIHUD with ESPREAD 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
r_ave r_ct r_oj r_gls r_mpeg 
DIVTAXRATE 0.0537*** 0.0517*** 0.0410*** 0.0771*** 0.0393*** 
  (29.951) (27.079) (19.196) (42.373) (13.072) 
ESPREAD 0.8526*** 0.7284*** 0.9187*** 0.6664*** 1.0965*** 
  (8.954) (6.883) (8.247) (7.245) (6.920) 
INST 0.0028** 0.0024* 0.0040*** 0.0030** 0.0040** 
  (2.126) (1.729) (2.660) (2.326) (1.964) 
YIELD 0.0141 -0.0050 0.0339 0.0415** 0.0235 
  (0.691) (-0.219) (1.365) (2.310) (0.734) 
SIZE -0.0030*** -0.0026*** -0.0036*** -0.0014*** -0.0046*** 
  (-13.301) (-10.741) (-14.036) (-6.074) (-12.566) 
BM 0.0156*** 0.0034*** 0.0137*** 0.0197*** 0.0227*** 
  (15.049) (3.295) (11.318) (19.150) (13.276) 
ROE -0.0015 0.0057*** -0.0047*** 0.0050*** -0.0137*** 
  (-1.557) (4.667) (-4.222) (4.635) (-7.461) 
LEV 0.0223*** 0.0256*** 0.0230*** 0.0118*** 0.0303*** 
  (14.006) (13.875) (12.664) (7.671) (12.021) 
BETA_MKTRF 0.0030*** 0.0017*** 0.0035*** 0.0020*** 0.0051*** 
  (9.636) (5.272) (9.526) (6.405) (9.987) 
BETA_SMB 0.0025*** 0.0015*** 0.0028*** 0.0016*** 0.0037*** 
  (8.799) (5.039) (8.659) (5.806) (8.138) 
BETA_HML -0.0013*** 0.0003 -0.0014*** -0.0018*** -0.0016*** 
  (-5.250) (1.400) (-4.972) (-7.450) (-4.188) 
BETA_UMD -0.0014*** -0.0008** -0.0018*** 0.0005* -0.0033*** 
  (-4.382) (-2.555) (-5.062) (1.802) (-6.644) 
FBIAS 0.3176*** 0.2472*** 0.3580*** 0.1319*** 0.4970*** 
  (20.053) (14.900) (20.200) (10.548) (20.589) 
Constant 0.1314*** 0.1263*** 0.1678*** 0.0492*** 0.1856*** 
  (25.883) (24.540) (28.873) (9.593) (22.210) 
Observations 20,724 21,585 20,751 21,426 20,653 
R-squared 0.323 0.208 0.272 0.434 0.263 
This table presents results of estimating a modified version of equation (1) where we replace AMIHUD with 
ESPREAD.  The dependent variable is r_ave, r_ct, r_oj, r_gls, and r_mpeg in columns (1)-(5), respectively. 
See Table 2 for variable definitions. Industry indicator variables are included in the estimation but suppressed 
in the table. T-statistics are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and appear in parentheses below 
coefficient estimates. ***,**, * denote statistically significant at p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10, respectively, 
using a two-tailed test.  
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Table 8 (continued) 
Analysis Using Alternate Proxy for Liquidity 
 
Panel B: Estimation of equation (2) replacing AMIHUD with ESPREAD 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
r_ave r_ct r_oj r_gls r_mpeg 
DIVTAXRATE 0.0604*** 0.0600*** 0.0466*** 0.0848*** 0.0427*** 
  (26.926) (25.833) (17.001) (41.801) (10.751) 
ESPREAD 0.7168*** 0.5678*** 0.8157*** 0.4993*** 1.0867*** 
  (7.092) (5.129) (6.900) (5.181) (6.276) 
DIVTAXRATE*ESPREAD 3.7786*** 4.6735*** 2.9652*** 4.4788*** 1.0088 
  (4.672) (5.594) (3.085) (6.726) (0.702) 
INST 0.0018 0.0013 0.0032** 0.0020 0.0037* 
  (1.354) (0.888) (2.105) (1.498) (1.758) 
YIELD 0.0219 0.0084 0.0404 0.0526*** 0.0339 
  (1.058) (0.364) (1.598) (2.765) (1.047) 
DIVTAXRATE*YIELD 0.4599*** 0.6077*** 0.4353*** 0.4873*** 0.5851*** 
  (4.494) (5.560) (3.235) (4.993) (3.511) 
SIZE -0.0032*** -0.0027*** -0.0037*** -0.0016*** -0.0047*** 
  (-13.572) (-11.158) (-14.141) (-6.604) (-12.416) 
BM 0.0155*** 0.0033*** 0.0136*** 0.0196*** 0.0225*** 
  (14.953) (3.164) (11.234) (19.013) (13.160) 
ROE -0.0017* 0.0055*** -0.0049*** 0.0048*** -0.0138*** 
  (-1.745) (4.497) (-4.341) (4.481) (-7.483) 
LEV 0.0227*** 0.0262*** 0.0233*** 0.0122*** 0.0308*** 
  (14.205) (14.259) (12.821) (7.924) (12.176) 
BETA_MKTRF 0.0030*** 0.0017*** 0.0035*** 0.0020*** 0.0051*** 
  (9.512) (5.127) (9.436) (6.290) (9.904) 
BETA_SMB 0.0025*** 0.0015*** 0.0028*** 0.0015*** 0.0037*** 
  (8.685) (4.972) (8.576) (5.742) (8.173) 
BETA_HML -0.0013*** 0.0003 -0.0014*** -0.0018*** -0.0016*** 
  (-5.352) (1.210) (-5.049) (-7.603) (-4.289) 
BETA_UMD -0.0014*** -0.0009*** -0.0018*** 0.0005* -0.0033*** 
  (-4.473) (-2.667) (-5.103) (1.671) (-6.595) 
FBIAS 0.3166*** 0.2460*** 0.3573*** 0.1307*** 0.4971*** 
  (19.926) (14.780) (20.117) (10.422) (20.595) 
Constant 0.1322*** 0.1270*** 0.1682*** 0.0500*** 0.1848*** 
  (25.794) (24.530) (28.727) (9.714) (21.996) 
Observations 20,724 21,585 20,751 21,426 20,653 
R-squared 0.325 0.210 0.273 0.436 0.263 
This table presents results of estimating a modified version of equation (2) where we replace AMIHUD with 
ESPREAD.  The dependent variable is r_ave, r_ct, r_oj, r_gls, and r_mpeg in columns (1)-(5), respectively. 
See Table 2 for variable definitions. Industry indicator variables are included in the estimation but suppressed 
in the table. T-statistics are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and appear in parentheses below 
coefficient estimates. ***,**, * denote statistically significant at p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10, 
respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 8 (continued) 
Analysis Using Alternate Proxy for Liquidity 
 
Panel C: Estimation of equation (3) replacing AMIHUD with ESPREAD 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
r_ave r_ct r_oj r_gls r_mpeg 
DIVTAXRATE 0.0562*** 0.0541*** 0.0436*** 0.0788*** 0.0428*** 
  (30.806) (27.926) (19.675) (43.293) (13.952) 
ESPREAD 0.8358*** 0.7355*** 0.8982*** 0.6724*** 1.0774*** 
  (8.627) (6.847) (7.939) (7.162) (6.701) 
INST 0.0017 0.0017 0.0028* 0.0025* 0.0026 
  (1.227) (1.125) (1.806) (1.808) (1.207) 
DIVTAXRATE*INST -0.0297*** -0.0192** -0.0317*** -0.0146** -0.0391*** 
  (-3.849) (-2.384) (-3.489) (-2.025) (-3.046) 
YIELD 0.0195 0.0066 0.0381 0.0510*** 0.0312 
  (0.943) (0.284) (1.505) (2.683) (0.956) 
DIVTAXRATE*YIELD 0.2780** 0.4474*** 0.2620* 0.3529*** 0.4274** 
  (2.552) (3.840) (1.847) (3.490) (2.394) 
SIZE -0.0031*** -0.0026*** -0.0037*** -0.0014*** -0.0047*** 
  (-13.385) (-10.753) (-14.102) (-6.114) (-12.631) 
BM 0.0154*** 0.0032*** 0.0135*** 0.0195*** 0.0224*** 
  (14.889) (3.090) (11.184) (18.972) (13.142) 
ROE -0.0015 0.0057*** -0.0048*** 0.0049*** -0.0138*** 
  (-1.639) (4.619) (-4.302) (4.593) (-7.532) 
LEV 0.0226*** 0.0261*** 0.0233*** 0.0121*** 0.0307*** 
  (14.171) (14.190) (12.800) (7.869) (12.164) 
BETA_MKTRF 0.0030*** 0.0017*** 0.0035*** 0.0020*** 0.0050*** 
  (9.381) (5.059) (9.313) (6.200) (9.779) 
BETA_SMB 0.0025*** 0.0015*** 0.0028*** 0.0016*** 0.0037*** 
  (8.724) (5.075) (8.567) (5.830) (8.085) 
BETA_HML -0.0013*** 0.0003 -0.0014*** -0.0018*** -0.0016*** 
  (-5.364) (1.214) (-5.060) (-7.580) (-4.294) 
BETA_UMD -0.0014*** -0.0008** -0.0018*** 0.0005* -0.0033*** 
  (-4.380) (-2.499) (-5.066) (1.845) (-6.641) 
FBIAS 0.3168*** 0.2471*** 0.3571*** 0.1318*** 0.4959*** 
  (19.978) (14.883) (20.121) (10.535) (20.530) 
Constant 0.1318*** 0.1260*** 0.1683*** 0.0489*** 0.1860*** 
  (25.747) (24.316) (28.706) (9.491) (22.103) 
Observations 20,724 21,585 20,751 21,426 20,653 
R-squared 0.324 0.209 0.273 0.435 0.264 
This table presents results of estimating a modified version of equation (3) where we replace AMIHUD with 
ESPREAD.  The dependent variable is r_ave, r_ct, r_oj, r_gls, and r_mpeg in columns (1)-(5), respectively. 
See Table 2 for variable definitions. Industry indicator variables are included in the estimation but suppressed 
in the table. T-statistics are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and appear in parentheses below 
coefficient estimates. ***,**, * denote statistically significant at p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10, respectively, 
using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 8 (continued) 
Analysis Using Alternate Proxy for Liquidity 
 
Panel D: Estimation of equation (4) replacing AMIHUD with ESPREAD 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
r_ave r_ct r_oj r_gls r_mpeg 
DIVTAXRATE 0.0601*** 0.0602*** 0.0461*** 0.0851*** 0.0414*** 
  (26.404) (25.599) (16.515) (41.431) (10.161) 
ESPREAD 0.7246*** 0.5630*** 0.8296*** 0.4913*** 1.1163*** 
  (7.165) (5.088) (6.994) (5.114) (6.372) 
DIVTAXRATE*ESPREAD 3.2170*** 5.0623*** 1.9849* 5.0534*** -1.1337 
  (3.510) (5.286) (1.807) (6.662) (-0.677) 
INST 0.0015 0.0015 0.0027* 0.0023* 0.0026 
  (1.110) (0.991) (1.741) (1.646) (1.232) 
DIVTAXRATE*INST -0.0119 0.0083 -0.0207** 0.0121 -0.0453*** 
  (-1.397) (0.913) (-2.045) (1.501) (-3.120) 
YIELD 0.0210 0.0092 0.0389 0.0537*** 0.0307 
  (1.011) (0.396) (1.534) (2.813) (0.941) 
DIVTAXRATE*YIELD 0.4070*** 0.6432*** 0.3425** 0.5380*** 0.3818** 
  (3.584) (5.288) (2.322) (5.120) (2.055) 
SIZE -0.0032*** -0.0027*** -0.0037*** -0.0016*** -0.0047*** 
  (-13.567) (-11.159) (-14.133) (-6.608) (-12.402) 
BM 0.0154*** 0.0033*** 0.0135*** 0.0196*** 0.0224*** 
  (14.940) (3.172) (11.213) (19.021) (13.133) 
ROE -0.0017* 0.0056*** -0.0049*** 0.0048*** -0.0138*** 
  (-1.751) (4.501) (-4.355) (4.489) (-7.518) 
LEV 0.0227*** 0.0262*** 0.0233*** 0.0122*** 0.0307*** 
  (14.196) (14.277) (12.809) (7.939) (12.161) 
BETA_MKTRF 0.0030*** 0.0017*** 0.0035*** 0.0020*** 0.0050*** 
  (9.442) (5.149) (9.341) (6.341) (9.768) 
BETA_SMB 0.0025*** 0.0015*** 0.0028*** 0.0016*** 0.0037*** 
  (8.650) (4.989) (8.521) (5.775) (8.101) 
BETA_HML -0.0013*** 0.0003 -0.0014*** -0.0018*** -0.0016*** 
  (-5.354) (1.211) (-5.053) (-7.603) (-4.298) 
BETA_UMD -0.0014*** -0.0009*** -0.0018*** 0.0005* -0.0033*** 
  (-4.479) (-2.664) (-5.115) (1.677) (-6.617) 
FBIAS 0.3163*** 0.2462*** 0.3569*** 0.1310*** 0.4960*** 
  (19.907) (14.798) (20.084) (10.446) (20.548) 
Constant 0.1324*** 0.1268*** 0.1686*** 0.0498*** 0.1858*** 
  (25.782) (24.424) (28.716) (9.651) (22.056) 
Observations 20,724 21,585 20,751 21,426 20,653 
R-squared 0.325 0.211 0.274 0.436 0.264 
This table presents results of estimating a modified version of equation (4) where we replace AMIHUD with 
ESPREAD.  The dependent variable is r_ave, r_ct, r_oj, r_gls, and r_mpeg in columns (1)-(5), respectively. See 
Table 2 for variable definitions. Industry indicator variables are included in the estimation but suppressed in the 
table. T-statistics are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and appear in parentheses below 
coefficient estimates. ***,**, * denote statistically significant at p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p < 0.10, respectively, 
using a two-tailed test. 
 
